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Thischapter presents a model in which an individual's income
can be related to his years of schooling, years of labor market ex-
perience, and level of employment (weeks worked) during the
year. It is a brief exposition of what has come to be called the ex-
panded "human capital earnings function." The mean and vari-
ance of the function are computed and used empirically in Chap-
ters 7 and 8 to explain interstate differences in the income
distribution of the United States and Canada.
INVESTMENT IN TRAINING
If earnings were due only to investments in training and em-
ployment lasted the full year, there would be a simple relationship
between earnings and training parameters. Suppose V'0is a full
year's earnings of an individual with zero training, and he invests
(direct and opportunity costs) 100k per cent of his potential in-
come in year 1. If he does not undertake additional investments,
and there is no depreciation of his stock of capital, his earning in
year 2 and in all subsequent periods will be
Y +r,(k, Yo(l+r1k1), (6-1)
where r,is his average rate of return on the investment and k, Y0
1. The expanded human capital earnings function was developed by
Jacob Mincer in his Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, Part 1, NBER, 1974.
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is the dollar value of the investment. If he invests in N periods of
training, his earnings after training will be shown by the identity
(6-2)
where r1 is the average rate of return on the investment in the jth
period and kis the fraction of potential earnings in year jthatwas
invested 2
Theearnings an individual could receive if he did not invest in
training after N years is his gross or potential earnings Net
earnings (YN) are gross earnings after investment costs are de-
ducted. That is,
kN÷j),
where kN+j is the fraction of potential (gross) earnings invested in
year N + 1. Net earnings are equal to' observed (or reported) earn-
ings in a year only if all training costs are opportunity costs. If
some training costs involve direct or out of pocket expenditures,
gross earnings exceed observed earnings, which exceed net earnings.
During some years of formal schooling direct costs are substan-
tial. During postschool investment in on-the-job training direct
costs are negligible to the worker since the direct costs of the train-
ing provided by the firm are deducted from the "trainee's" wages.3
The net earnings of a worker investing 100kN+I per cent of his
potential earnings are
=Y0fJ(1+ (1- kN+l). (6-3)
2. From the principle of mathematical induction, if a relationship holds
for j =1,and if, when it holds for j =Nit also holds for I =N+1,then it
holds for all values of j. The relation was shown to hold fan=1in the text.
=V0[f(1+ and an N + 1st year of investment is undertaken,
J=I
N+i
= + rN+I(kN+I =(1 + rN+lkN+l) =V0fi(1+
1=1
Thus,the expression is valid for all values of 1.
3. While firms provide training, they do not finance any general training
(training useful in many firms) and finance only part of specific training
(training useful only in that specific firm). See Gary Becker, Human Capital,
1974, Ch. 2, and Donald Parsons, "Specific Human Capital: An Application
to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates," Journal of Political Economy, November-
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WEEKS WORKED
The model thus far assumes full employment of the worker
during the year. Actual "net annual earnings" are lower than "net
full-year employment earnings" to the extent that the worker is
unemployed or absent from the labor force during part of the year.
Employment will be expressed in terms of weeks worked, since
this is the form used for employment data in the empirical analysis.
If weekly wages were independent of the number of weeks worked,
we could write
=yo (1+ (1-kN+i)](WW) (6-4)
where isnow annual net earnings, Y0 is the worker's earnings
if he had not invested, the terms in square brackets represent the
contribution of past and current human capital investments to his
current net earnings, and (WW) is the fraction of weeks in the year
N ÷ 1 in which he works.4
Within the human capital framework, there are two reasons for
believing that weekly wages and weeks worked are not independent
of each other. First, those who have greater investments in training
specific to a firm have higher wage rates and lower quit and layoff
rates, and consequently work more weeks per year.5 Second, those
who have higher weekly wages because of greater investment in
training (regardless of whether it is general or specific) face a higher
opportunity cost of time and will work more during the year if the
substitution effect outweighs the adverse effect on work effort
produced by the increase in wealth due to the investment.6 These
points are part and parcel of the human capital analysis of
earnings.
4.Itis assumed that investments in training are proportional to time
spent working.
5. See Becker, Human Capital, Part 1, and Parsons, "Specific Human
Capital" for the relation between specific training and quit and layoff rates.
Workers with lower levels of skill have more frequent spells of unemployment,
and a slightly longer duration per spell. See R. Morganstern and N. S. Barrett,
"Occupational Discrimination and Changing Labor Force Participation: Their
Effects on Unemployment Rates of Blacks and Women," 1971, Mimeo.
6. Investments in human capital increase wealth only to the extent that
the internal rate of return (r) on the investment exceeds the opportunity cost
of the funds invested (R). For an investment of C dollars with a constant an•
C(r-R)
nual return and an infinite life the increase in wealth is
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Outside of the human capital framework there are additional
reasons for a connection between weeks worked during the year
and weekly earnings. First, if the higher weekly wage for the weeks
actually worked is due to cyclical or seasonal sensitivity of employ-
ment in an industry, there will be a negative correlation between
weeks worked and weekly wages, ceteris paribus.7 Second, those
whose weekly wages are higher for reasons other than investment
in human capital or seasonal fluctuations (for example, due to
ability, luck, or discrimination) will wish to work more weeks if
their supply curve is upward rising. That is, if the price effect of
the higher wage exceeds the wealth (income) effect, they will
supply more labor to the market.
Finally, it has been observed that there is a positive correlation
between weeks worked per year and hours worked per week.8
Since those who work more hours per week have higher weekly
wages, a positive correlation between hours per week and weeks
per year, holding investment in human capital constant, results in
a positive correlation of weekly wages with weeks worked. Note,
however, that this is not a statistical artifact—this correlation is
related to human capital analysis and labor supply theory. Those
human capital and labor supply forces that encourage a greater
labor supply in terms of weeks also encourage a greater labor sup-
ply in terms of hours.
Let us define y as the elasticity of annual earnings with respect
to the fraction of weeks worked per year. Human capital theory,
upward rising labor supply curves, and the positive correlation of
hours worked per week with weeks worked per year all predict that
those with higher weekly wages work more weeks per year. This
implies a -y greater than unity. The backward bending labor supply
curve and cyclical or seasonal sensitivity of employment predict
that those with higher weekly wages have a larger annual income
but work fewer weeks per year. They predict a y greater than zero
but less than unity.9 Empirically, Mincer found -y =1.17,which
was significantly greater than unity, for white nonfarm, nonstudent
7. The third of Adam Smith's five points which "make up for a small
pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in
others" is "the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them." (Wealth i)
of Nations, Modern Library Edition, 1937, p. 100.) The effect of seasonality e
of employment on weekly wages is analyzed in Chapter 2 of this study.
8. Victor Fuchs, Differentials in Hourly Earnings by Region and City
Size, 1959, NBER, Occasional Paper 101, p. 4.
9. Define Y as observed annual earnings, Y' as full year employment
earnings, and W as the number of weeks worked. If those with higher weekly
wages work more weeks during the year, Y'/52> Y/W, where W< 52. Since
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males with earnings from the 1/1,000 sample of the 1960 Census
of Population.'°
Thus, the human capital earnings function is written as:
YN = (1+ (1-kN÷l)](WW)7, (6-5)
where y is the elasticity of annual earnings with respect to the frac-
tion of weeks worked. Weeks worked and -y are not simply stan-
dardizing variables, but, rather, integral parts of the human capital
model and labor supply theory.
EMPIRICAL FORMULATION
The human capital earnings function in equation (6-5) relates
annual net earnings (YN) to the number of periods of investment
(N), the fraction of potential earnings which was invested in the
past (k1, j= 1,...,N),the fraction of potential earnings invested
in the current year (kN+thefraction of weeks worked during the
year (WW), and the relation between weekly wages and weeks
worked ('y). This functional form, however, is not desirable for
several reasons. First, with the exception of N and WW, these vari-
ables are not readily measurable. Second, linear models are easier
to estimate empirically than nonlinear models. Third, if the vari-
ance of both sides of the equation is computed, the variance of in-
come is a function of the variance of a product of terms. However,
interest in income inequality is greater for relative than for absolute
inequality. Relative inequality is devoid of units and therefore
Y— Y' (ww)7, where ww or > This
holds if y>1.
If those with higher weekly wages work fewer weeks per year, Y'/52 <
Y'Y'
Y/W where W < 52. Then,< or (W)'11 > This holds
if 'y < 1. However, if annual earnings are higher for those with more weeks of
employment, Y'> Y or Y'> Y' For W< 52, this is true only if
y> 0. Thus, if those with higher weekly wages have higher annual incomes
but work fewer weeks, 0 <7 < 1.
10. This value—and further references to Mincer's data—are taken from
the 1972 mimeographed version of his Schooling, Experience, and Earnings.
The data in the 1974 version differ only slightly from the earlier ones and do
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facilitates intercountry comparisons. Moreover, computing the van-
ance of a product of terms is more difficult than computing a sum
of terms." Thus, the algebraic manipulations of equation (6-5)
that follow are designed to convert the equation into a functional
form which facilitates the theoretical and empirical analysis of in-
come distribution.'2
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of equation (6-5),
and using the relation that the natural log of one plus a small num-
ber is approximately equal to that small number,'3 we obtain I -
(approximately)
=lnY0+ +in(1- kN+j) +y(1nWW).(6-6)
The N years of training can be decomposed into S years of
schooling followed by N -Syears of postschool training if it is as-
sumed that schooling precedes on-the-job training. The T =N-S
years of postschool training can also be approximated as T =A-
S-5,where A is age and it is assumed the worker is investing in t
training in each of the years since the age at which he left school
(S +5years). If we assume that during the years of schooling the
opportunity costs and direct costs of schooling are approximately
equal to the potential or gross earnings of students,'4 we can write
=1for the schooling years. Let us also assume that the rate of
return from schooling is constant for an individual for all levels of
schooling.'5 Then we can write
=rS+
j=i j—S+1
11.See Leo Goodman, "On the Exact Variance of a Product," Journal of
the American Statistical Association, December 1960, pp. 708—713. L
12. Thesemanipulationsofthe postschooltrainingvariables were
rj
developedin Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, Part 1, and re- t
ported in Chiswick and Mincer, "Time Series Changes in Income Inequality,"
Journal of Political Economy, Supplement, May-June 1973.
13. in (1 + Since rj is likely to be in the neighborhood of 10
to 20 per cent, and k, is not likely to be greater than unity, rjk1 is sufficiently
small to make the approximation quite close.
14. Becker, Human Capital, Chapter 4; and G. Hanoch, "An Economic
Analysis of Earnings and Schooling," Journal of Human Resources, Summer a
1967, pp. 3 10-329.
15. There is some empirical support for this assumption. Using data for
white nonfarm, nonstudent males with earnings, Mincer found no evidence
of a higher (or lower) rate of return for higher levels of schooling when weeks
and experience were held constant. (Schooling, Experience, and Earn-
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To evaluate the postschool training expression we
J =s +t
must make some assumption concerning the temporal behavior of
k1, the fraction of gross earnings invested. There are several reasons
for believing that k1 declines over time.'6 First, if labor market ex-
perience raises the productivity of time devoted to employment
more than that devoted to the production of additional training,
the opportunity cost of time invested in experience rises with addi-
tional experience. This decreases the profitability of additional in-
vestment. Second, additional experience reduces the length of the
remaining working life and consequently the profitability of invest-
ment. Finally, if an investment is profitable, it is more profitable
(i.e., has the highest net present value) the earlier it is undertaken.
The decline with experience of the fraction of potential earnings
that is invested is consistent with the observed concavity of the
age-earnings profile.
Thus, it is assumed that k declines monotonically over a life-
time. For simplicity's sake, we assume thatdeclines linearly:
=h,(1 -T/T*),where T is the number of years of postschool
training, T* is the number of years of positive net investment, and
k0 is the fraction of potential income invested in the initial (T =0)
year of postschool training. T* is a large number. Converting to
continuous time,
1T
dT =(r1k0)T T2, (6-7)
and the effect on the log of earnings of past investments in experi-
ence is a parabolic function of years of experience (T).
By assumingdeclines linearly with experience, the term
In (1 -can be evaluated as a function of experience (T) by a
Taylor expansion. Using a Taylor expansion evaluated around T*
taken to the third term, and ignoring the remainder,
ln (1- kT+I) =-k0(i
+ +
(1+ k0) T + T2.
(6-8)
Let us assume that variations across individuals in Y0, k0, T*
andappear in a residual U.. Then, using the subscript ito desig-
e 16. See Yoram Ben-Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and the
Life Cycle of Earnings," Journal of Political Economy, August 1967,
pp. 352-365; and Gary Becker, Human Capital and Personal Income Distribu-
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nate individuals, combining the several previous steps, andrear-
ranging terms,
in (Y,) =[mY0-k0(i+ + r.S,+[ri*ko+ (1+ko)]T,
T* +k21
-L' j
+ 'V +u1, (6-9)
whereis the rate of return from schooling andis the rate of
return from postschool training.
Equation (6-9) expresses the log of income as a linear function
of years of schooling, years of experience, years of experience
squared, and the log of weeks worked. While data are generally not
available for dollar investments in schooling or postschool training,
data for investments measured in years exist in abundance. Indeed,
much of public policy appears to be framed in terms of years of
investment rather than dollar investments.
In this monograph the variable "experience squared" (T2) is
deleted for two reasons. First, in the analysis of income level, the
mean levels of experience and experience squared are so highly
correlated that multicollinearity becomes a problem. Second, in
the analysis of income inequality, retaining experience squared
necessitates computing the third and fourth moments of exper-
ience, but the additional explanatory power is not likely to be
large. However, deleting the term experience squared biases the
slopecoefficientof experience downward. When experience
squared is deleted, the coefficient of experience is designated r.
The term r is the slope of the experience log income profile.
The variable experience (T) is replaced by age minus schooling
minus five. Public policy can change the distribution of schooling
independently of age, but if it does so, the distribution of exper-
ience is necessarily altered. There is also more concern with the
distribution of earnings by age group than by experience group.
Thus, it would be desirable to express earnings as a function of
schooling and age (A). Fortunately, this is easy to do if we assume
T =AS -5.The assumption, however, that an individual is
continuously acquiring experience in the labor market after leav-
ing school means that this formulation of the model is more rele-
vant to an analysis of the income of males than to that of females,
since the latter frequently have long periods of absence from the
labor force.'7
17. For an analysis of the effect of labor market experience on the earn-
ings of women, see Jacob Mincer and Solomon Polachek, "Family Invest-
ments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," Journal of Political Economy,
Supplement, March 1974, pp. S76—S109.
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With these modifications, equation (6-9) becomes
lnY1=X+r,S1+r(A1-S1- 5)+y(lnWW1)+U1,(6-10)
where X is the intercept and U1 is a residual. The residual, U1, re-
flects individual differences in earnings for given levels of school-
ing, rates of return from schooling, age, and employment. It
includes the effects of differences in the dollar amounts of post-
school training in each year of experience, the nonpecuniary as-
pects of jobs, nonlabor income (if this is included in the income
concept), luck, and errors of measurement, among other variables.
We assume that the residual is a random variable.
For the purpose of human capital analysis, equation (6-10) has
several desirable features. First, the available data sources permit
us to measure investments in human capital in terms of years of
schooling and years of labor market experience rather than dollar
investments, and equation (6-10) relates income to years of train-
ing. Second, since income is more closely approximated by a log
normal than a normal distribution, the structure in equation (6-10)
will have residuals which are more homoscedastic than the struc-
ture in equation (6-5). Finally, there appears to be more interest
in the relative than in the absolute level and inequality of income,
and equation (6-10) is better suited to an investigation of relative
income. Thus, this equation shall serve as the basic human capital
earnings function in my analysis of the income level and inequality
of adult males.
In the following two chapters the mean and variance of both
sides of the human capital earnings function will be computed.
Computing the mean of a product of two variables (r1S1 and
rT1) is easy. This is not true, however, of the variance of a product
of two random variables, unless these variables are statistically
independent.'8 For the analysis of income inequality, the plausible
assumptions will be made that r1is independent of S, and ris
independent of T1. There is both theoretical and empirical support
for these assumptions.'9
For a nontechnical analysis, see also Council of Economic Advisers,
Economic Report of the President, 1974, Washington, D.C. 1974, pp. 154-
161.
18. Goodman, "On the Exact Variance of a Product," December 1960.
19. The theoretical support relies on the model dealing with supply and
demand for funds to be invested in human capital. Individuals with greater
"training ability" have, for a given cost of funds, a higher average and mar-
ginal rate of return, and thus tend to invest more. Those with lower levels of
wealth, holding "training ability" constant, invest more but have a lower
average and marginal rate of return. If greater wealth and greater "ability" are
positively correlated, the relation between level of investment and marginal
and average rates of return is ambiguous. Empirical support is found in the116 Incomeas a Function of Schooling and Market Experience
RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE AGE-INCOME PROFILE
Much of the analysis of racial differences in the level of in-
come in Chapter 7 and of income inequality in Chapter 8 will
focus on the parameter r' in equation (6-10), the slope of the cross-
sectional age—log-of-income profile, when schooling and weeks
worked are held constant. A cross-sectional profile represents the
income of persons at different ages at a moment in time (for ex-
ample, the year 1959). This is shown by the curve BB in Figure
6-1. The slope of the profile is the per cent change in income as
we look at older persons.
There is abundant evidence from many different data sets that
the slope of the cross-sectional age—log-of-income profile is flatter
for nonwhite males than for white males.2° A flatter cross-
sectional profile can occur for one or both of the following rea-
sons. First, it may be that nonwhites have a flatter cohort profile.
A cohort profile is obtained by observing the income of a group
(cohort) of individuals as they age. Three cohort profiles (A A
A2A2 ,A3A3) for three different age groups are shown in Figure
6-1. A nonwhite cohort could have a flatter age-income profile
than a white cohort because of the former's smaller investments in
postschool training or their lower rates of return from this train-
ing. This may occur if nonwhites invest in less postschool training
because of a lower level of wealth or in a poorer quality of school-
ing, if they are discriminated against in training opportunities, or
if nonwhites who acquire postschool training are subject to more
wage and occupational discrimination than less well-trained non-
whites. Ceteris paribus, a set of flatter cohort profiles would
translate into a flatter cross-sectional profile.
Second, nonwhites may have a flatter cross-sectional profile
absence of a significant partial effect for schooling squared when the log of
earnings is regressed on schooling, schooling squared, experience, and the log
of weeks worked. See Becker, Human Capital and the Personal Distribution
of Income; Becker and Chiswick, "Education and the Distribution of Earn-
ings," American Economic Review, May 1966, pp. 358-369; and Mincer,
Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, Part 2.
20. See, for example, Jacob Mincer, "On-the-Job Training: Costs, Re-
turns, and Implications," Journal of Political Economy, Supplement, October
1962, pp. 50-79; Thomas Johnson, "Returns from Investment in Human
Capital," American Economic Review, September 1970, pp. 546-560; Finis
Welch, "Black.White Differences in the Returns to Schooling," American
Economic Review, December 1973, pp. 893-907; and Council of Economic
Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974,
pp. 150-154.The Expanded Human Capital Model 117
FIGURE 6-1
Hypothetical Cross-Section and Cohort Age-Income
Profiles for Males
than whites because the height of the cohort profiles is rising faster
over time for young nonwhites than for young whites. This could
occur if there has been a secular decline in discrimination against
nonwhites, particularly young nonwhites, in the labor market (in
wages or in occupation) or in the quality of schooling. Recent
studies suggest that there has been, indeed, a decline in labor
market and school quality discrimination.2'
21. The ratio of nonwhite to white expenditures per student in public
schools in the South decreased dramatically from 1890 to 1915, but in-
creased thereafter. For example, in Georgia the ratios of nonwhite to white







See Richard B. Freeman, "Labor Market Discrimination: Analysis, Find-
ings, and Problems," paper presented at Econometric Society meeting of
December 1972, Table 7. Similar evidence is reported in Finis Welch, "Black-
White Differences in Returns to Schooling," American Economic Review,
December 1973, pp. 893-907. In addition, Welch reports in the same article
that in the 1960s the ratio of the nonwhite to white rate of return from
schooling is higher for younger cohorts. This could be due to reduced dis-
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TABLE 6-1
Income of Nonwhite Males as Percentage of Income of White Males,
1949, 1959, and 1969
(per cent)
Type of Income
by Age Group 1949 1959 1969
Annual income:
25-34 years 57 57 65
35-44 years 48 52 56
45-54 years 46 49 53
55-64 years 45 48 51
Weekly income:
25-34 years 61 61 67
35-44 years 52 57 58
45-54 years 48 52 55
55-64 years 47 51 53
Note: Data for 1949 and 1959 relate to races other than white, data for
1969 relate to blacks only.
Sources: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974, Table 39, p. 152.
Table 6-1 presents data on the income of nonwhite males as a
percentage of the income of white males by age group for the
three years 1949, 1959, and 1969. The ratio of the nonwhite to
white cross-sectional age-income profile is obtained by reading
down the columns of the table. The data suggest a flatter cross-
sectional profile for nonwhites than for whites. Reading across the
rows reveals a rise in the ratio of nonwhite to white incomes over
time (with age held constant). That is, cohort profiles for non-
whites are rising at a faster rate than for whites.
If we read down the diagonals of Table 6-1 we follow a cohort
as it ages. The data suggest that, as a cohort ages, the ratio of non-
white to white income does not decline, or declines at a much
slower rate than the cross-sectional profile. Thus, the flatter non-
white cross-sectional profile is only partially due to a possibly
somewhat flatter cohort profile.
4